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have limited liability, and (iii) firms can contract to sell their output at a specified price before all
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Risk management has become an integral part of the ﬁnancial management of companies. Accord-
ing to a survey of large US non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms (Smithson [1996]), 65% of the responding ﬁrms
have used derivatives to manage risk. A similar Canadian study (reported in Smithson [1996])
found that 80% of large ﬁrms used derivatives to manage risk. Why do these ﬁrms hedge?
In order to provide a rationale for the hedging behavior of ﬁrms, existing theories have relied
upon the existence of taxes (Smith and Stulz (1985) and Graham and Smith (1996)), asymmetric
information, (DeMarzo and Dufﬁe (1991), Ljungqvist (1994), Breeden and Viswanathan (1996)
and Degeorge, Moselle and Zeckhauser (1996)), risk-aversion (Stulz (1990) and DeMarzo and
Dufﬁe (1995)) and costly external capital (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1994)). All these papers
take the ﬁrm as the basic ‘unit of analysis’. That is, cash ﬂows under alternative hedging scenarios
are exogenously speciﬁed and the ﬁrm’s problem is to choose that hedging strategy which maxi-
mizes its expected payoff. Following the seminal contributions of Brander and Lewis (1986) and
Maksimovic (1986)—which point out that there is an intimate relationship between product market
competition and a ﬁrm’s choice of capital structure—we provide a new explanation for hedging
that is based on non-competitive product market competition.1 The general ﬂavour of the Brander
and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1986) results carries over to a model where the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
decision is not one of choosing an appropriate debt/equity mix but instead deals with the amount of
futures contracts it should buy or sell. In particular, the ﬁrm may be able to act more aggressively
in the product market and, as a result, may be able to attain a higher payoff when it hedges it cash
1Maksimovic (1995) provides a nice summary of the ﬁnancial structure and product market competition literature.
Our paper is somewhat related to papers by Allaz (1992) and Allaz and Villa (1993). These papers examine pricing
and output policies of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms that can buy and sell forward contracts on their output. Firms,
however, do not buy or sell futures contracts.
2ﬂows. Hence, just as debt can be viewed as a device that commits the ﬁrm to act more aggressively
in the product market in the models of Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1986), futures
contracts can be viewed as providing the ﬁrm with the same kind of commitment in our model.
The intuition that underlies our model of corporate hedging is as follows. Firms compete in a
non-cooperate manner in the product market. A ﬁrm may be able to achieve a ‘ﬁrst-mover advan-
tage’ over rival ﬁrms and does so by selling its output contractually at a predetermined (delivery)
price, instead of waiting to compete directly in the spot market. If the ﬁrm does sell its output
contractually at a predetermined price, then it subjects itself to default risk since it agrees to sell
its output at a ﬁxed price before all factors affecting its productivity are known. For example, if ex
post input prices turn out to be ‘high’, the ﬁrm may default on its contractual obligations to deliver
output owing to insufﬁcient resources. Consumers are, of course, rational. The fact that the ﬁrm
may default in some states of the world will be, ex ante, impounded into the delivery price. If the
ﬁrm could somehow commit to delivery in all states of the world, consumers would bid up the
delivery price. The ﬁrm would like to commit to delivery if the expected proﬁt associated with de-
livery in all states is greater than the expected proﬁt associated with default in some states. In such
circumstances, the ﬁrm can commit to delivery in all states of the world by purchasing futures con-
tracts whose underlying asset is sufﬁciently correlated with its input prices. The futures contracts
will ‘pay off’ precisely at the time when the ﬁrm’s resources are strained. Hence, futures contracts
have value because they prevent the ﬁrm from defaulting on a contractual obligation when ‘not
defaulting’ is (ex ante) important.
It is not the case, however, that ﬁrms who sell their output contractually will want to hedge
their cash ﬂows in order to prevent default. (Surprisingly, it may not even be the case that a ﬁrm
3would want to exercise its ﬁrst mover advantage!) For some ﬁrms, hedging cash ﬂows to prevent
default on contractual obligations may actually lower expected payoffs. These ﬁrms will not use
futures contracts. This is an important result because although, in practice, a large proportion of
ﬁrms hedge (65% in the U.S.), a large number of ﬁrms do not. Any theory that attempts to provide
a rationale for corporate hedging must at the same time be consistent with the fact that not all
ﬁrms want to hedge. Our theory is consistent with both the strict preference of hedging and strict
preference with not hedging.
Below, we provide a model where a ﬁrm may hedge its input prices. This is but one example
why a ﬁrm might want to hedge risk. We could have, alternatively, formulated our model in an
international context. For example, a domestic ﬁrm may agree to sell its output abroad at a ﬁxed
delivery price denominated in a foreign currency. At the time when the ﬁrm is to produce and
ship the goods abroad, the exchange rate may move against the ﬁrm, implying that the ﬁrm will
default on its delivery contract. The ﬁrm can, however, avoid default by entering into a foreign
exchange futures contract. If the ﬁrm’s expected payoff is higher if it does not default, compared
to its expected payoff if it does default in some states, then the ﬁrm will, in fact, hedge its foreign
exchange exposure.
The paper is organized as follows. A model where two ﬁrms compete in the product market
is presented in the next section. Section 3 describes the equilibrium outcomes when a Stackel-
berg market structure is assumed, i.e., one ﬁrm competes by forward selling delivery contracts and
the other ﬁrm’s production decision is made after the ﬁrst ﬁrm delivers on its contractual obliga-
tions. Section 4 describes the equilibrium outcomes when an ex post Cournot market structure is
assumed, i.e., both ﬁrms wait until the state of the world is revealed and compete ` a la Cournot.
4Section 5 characterizes the ‘equilibrium market structure’, i.e., a ﬁrm can choose to be a leader
and competes contractually, or can choose to compete simultaneously in the ex post spot market.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Two ﬁrms compete for a given market demand. The ﬁrms are endowed with identical constant
returns to scale production technologies, are risk neutral and have limited liability. Firms have no
outside wealth.
One can interpret the ﬁrms as playing a game over two dates, date 1 and date 2. At date 1 the
unit costs of production are unknown but, between dates 1 and 2, these costs are revealed. We
assume, for simplicity, that there are only two states of the world: a low cost state of the world, l,
which occurs with probability θ and a high cost state of the world, h, which occurs with probability
1 − θ. We denote the unit cost of production as ωs, s ∈ {h,l}, where ωh > ωl, and the expected
unit cost of production as ¯ ω = θωl + (1 − θ)ωh.
Let xi represent the output that is supplied to the market by ﬁrm i ∈ {1,2} at date 2. Market
demand is represented by the linear inverse demand curve
p = a − x, a > 0,
where p represents the price of the good and x is market demand which equals market supply,
x1 + x2.
Firm 1 can choose when to sell its output to consumers. Firm 1 can either,
51. sell its output by writing contracts with consumers at date 1 or
2. sell its output at date 2—after the state of the world is revealed—in the ‘spot market’.
If ﬁrm 1 sells its output contractually at date 1, then each contract promises to deliver a one
unit of output at date 2 at a prespeciﬁed unit price, f. We will refer to such contracts as forward
contracts. Because the unit production costs are unknown at the time when a forward contract is
written, the date 2 payoff associated with a forward contract is uncertain. Denote the total number
of forward contracts written by ﬁrm 1 by X1. It is rather important to emphasize that, owing to
limited liability, ﬁrm 1 may end up defaulting on its forward contract obligations at date 2. This
could happen if, for example, the forward contract price, f, is less than the unit cost of production.
Firm 2 makes its production decision at date 2 and sells its output in the spot market.2
Firms may have an incentive to hedge their input prices. Although the purpose of this paper is
to understand why ﬁrms hedge, one can conjecture that ﬁrm 1 may wish to hedge in order to avoid
the possibility of defaulting on its forward contracts or that either ﬁrm 1 or 2 may choose to hedge
for strategic reasons. We suppose that at date 1 there exists a futures market that trades futures
contracts on the unit cost of production. As is convention, the futures price, Fω, is set so that the
value of the futures contract at inception is zero. The payoff to a futures contract is realized at date
2, where the payoff is a function of the difference between the futures price, Fω, and the date 2
unit cost of production, ωs. If the ﬁrm buys—or is ‘long’—in a futures contract the date 2 payoff
is ωs − Fω in state s ∈ {h,l}.3 A ﬁrm is said to hedge its input costs if the payoff to its futures
2The results of this paper will not be altered if we assume that ﬁrm 2 has the same choices, in terms of when to
compete, as ﬁrm 1. We show this in Section 5. Hence, the assumption that ﬁrm 2 can only compete in the spot market
should be viewed as a simplifying one.
3Although a futures contract pays off in dollars, one can conceptually think about a long futures position, i.e.,
buying a futures contract, as agreeing to purchase the input at date 2 for Fω. The buyer ends up paying Fω for an
object whose value is ωs: the buyer’s payoff is, therefore, ωs − Fω.
6contract position is positive when input prices are high and negative when input prices are low.
Hence, a ﬁrm hedges by taking a long position in futures contracts.
Because ﬁrms have limited liability, the lowest payoff that they can receive in any state is zero.









f = (f − ωs)X1 + (ωs − Fω)n1. (1)
The variable n1 in equation (1) represents ﬁrm 1’s position in the futures market. n1 > 0 indicates
that ﬁrm 1 has a long position of n1 futures contracts and n1 < 0 indicates that it has a net short
position of |n1| futures contracts. Note that if πs
f < 0, then ﬁrm 1 does not have sufﬁcient resources
tohonorallofitscontractualobligationsinstates. Inthiscase, ﬁrm1defaultsandreceivesapayoff
of zero.
Firm 2’s state s payoff and ﬁrm 1’s state s payoff in the event that it chooses to compete in the









i = (ps − ωs)x
s
i + (ωs − Fω)ni, i ∈ {1,2}, (2)
7where ps represents the spot price in state s. If there does not exist a level of spot market production
xs
i > 0 such that ﬁrm i ∈ {1,2} has sufﬁcient resources (psxs
i) to honor its obligations (ωsxs
i +
(Fω − ωs)ni) in state s, then it defaults on all of its contractual obligations in state s and receives
a payoff of zero.4
The futures market is perfectly competitive, i.e., no single trader can inﬂuence the futures price.
Financial market participants are assumed to be risk-neutral. A futures exchange initially acts as an
intermediary, matching long and short positions that are requested by ﬁnancial market participants.
After parties are ‘matched’, the futures exchange guarantees performance on all contracts, i.e.,
ﬁnancial market participants view that their contract is with the futures exchange. As guarantor the
exchange may limit the number of contracts that a ﬁrm buys or sells. In particular, the exchange
will buy and sell contracts from a ﬁrm as long as the (equilibrium) expected payoff to the exchange
for the transactions is greater than or equal to zero, the assumed competitive reservation value. A
ﬁrm will default on its futures contracts if it does not have sufﬁcient ex post resources to pay off
the contract in some state of the world.5
For simplicity, it is assumed that the discount rate between dates 1 and 2 is zero. An implication
4The simplest way to think about what happens when πs
i < 0, is that ﬁrm i ‘disappears’ and receives a zero
payoff and all contracts written by ﬁrm i become null and void. We could have, alternatively, closed the model by
having the productive and ﬁnancial assets of the ﬁrm auctioned off, where the proceeds of the auction are distributed
to individuals who hold claims on the defaulting ﬁrm. The new owner of the ﬁrm, i.e., the person who purchased
the productive assets of the ﬁrm, now competes at date 2 in the spot market. However, our results pertaining to the
hedging behavior of the ﬁrms are, qualitatively speaking, insensitive to the precise speciﬁcation of the market and
ownership structure in the event of a default. The intuition for this invariance is that, independent of how things are
resolved after a default, the owner of the defaulting ﬁrm is out of the market and receives a zero payoff. The fact that
the market continues and other agents are receiving possibly positive payoffs is irrelevant to the defaulting ﬁrm. It is
for this reason that we close the model in the (analytically) simplest way.
5In practice, a futures exchange requires parties to post margin accounts so that it (the exchange) can credibly
guarantee performance on all contracts. If a party is unable to post a sufﬁcient margin, then the party will be unable
to buy or sell the amount of contracts that it ‘desires’, i.e., the party will be quantity constrained. Since we assume
that the ﬁrm does not have any outside wealth the ﬁrm will be unable to post a margin. The exchange, therefore,
guarantees performance by limiting the number of contracts that it will buy or sell from a ﬁrm. In Section 5 we discuss
the implications of requiring ﬁrms to post margin accounts.
8of the zero discount rate assumption (along with the assumption that ﬁnancial market participants
are risk-neutral) is that Fω = ¯ ω, i.e., the futures price equals the expected unit cost.
The timing of events for the our model is as follows. At date 1:
• Firms simultaneously offer to take positions N1 and N2 with the futures exchange.
• The futures exchange accepts 0 ≤ ni ≤ Ni from ﬁrm i ∈ {1,2} if Ni ≥ 0 and 0 ≥ ni ≥ Ni
from ﬁrm i if Ni ≤ 0.
• Firm 1 offers output contracts X1 ≥ 0 for delivery at date 2.
• The representative consumer purchases all of X1; contract price f is established.6
This ends date 1. Before date 2 begins, the state of the world s ∈ {h,l} is revealed. At date 2:
• If X1 > 0, ﬁrm 1 produces output xs
1 ≤ X1 in state s and delivers it to the representative
consumer. Firm 2 then chooses output level xs
2 to supply in the spot market in state s. All
futures contracts are settled.
• If X1 = 0, ﬁrm 1 and 2 simultaneously choose output levels xs
1 and xs
2, respectively, to
supply to the spot market in state s. All futures contracts are settled.
Note that when X1 > 0 and ﬁrm 1 delivers xs
1 ≤ X1 contracts at date 2, then ﬁrm 2 effectively





6One could model the representative consumer as behaving ‘strategically’, i.e., the representative consumer can
purchase any amount of output contracts less than or equal to Xi from ﬁrm i ∈ {1,2}. The idea here is that represen-
tative consumer will purchase that amount of output contracts which minimizes the expected product price. (It is not
necessarily the case that purchasing all of X1 minimizes the expected price of the good.) Modeling the representative
consumer as a strategic agent does not qualitatively alter the main results of this paper, i.e., the reasons for why a ﬁrm
may want to hedge remains valid if we allow consumers to act strategically.
9at date 2, where a0 = a−xs
1. We shall assume that the input price in the high cost state is not ‘too’
high in that a − ¯ ω > 2ωh.7
In terms of the information structure, we assume that all market participants can observe the
actions taken by all players and can observe all market outcomes, i.e., information is complete.
There is, however, imperfect information between ﬁrms 1 and 2 at date 1 when ﬁrms make their
futures contract decisions and at date 2 when ﬁrms make their output decisions in the event that
X1 = 0.
The equilibrium concept that will be used is that of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE).
A SPE requires that candidate equilibrium strategies are Nash at each and every subgame. Very
loosely speaking, in the description of the timing of the game above, each ‘bullet’ represents a
subgame.
We will proceed by ﬁrst assuming that ﬁrm 1 can only compete by selling forward contracts.
This situation will be referred to as a ‘Stackelberg market structure’ since ﬁrm 1 gets to choose its
output level before ﬁrm 2 does. We then assume that ﬁrm 1 can only compete by producing and
selling in the spot market. This situation will be referred to as an ‘ex post Cournot market structure’
since ﬁrms compete simultaneously after the state of the world is revealed. Firm 1’s equilibrium
behavior can be determined by simply comparing the expected proﬁts that it generates under the
Stackelberg market structure with the expected proﬁts generated under the ex post Cournot market
structure.
7The intuition behind this inequality will be explained at the time that it is introduced into the analysis, see footnote
9.
103 Analysis of a ‘Stackelberg Market Structure’
As is standard, the model can be solved in two stages: the ﬁrst stage characterizes the equilibrium
behavior of ﬁrm 2; the second stage characterizes the equilibrium behavior of ﬁrm 1 and identiﬁes
the equilibrium to the game. Before we begin the stage 1 analysis we can present a preliminary
result that deals with ﬁrms’ futures positions.
Ifﬁrmi ∈ {1,2}defaultsinonestateoftheworld, then, inequilibrium, itsfuturescontractposition
must be zero, i.e., ni = 0.
This result reﬂects that fact if ﬁrm i defaults in one state of the world, then either the futures
exchange or ﬁrm i will have entered into a contractual arrangement that has a strictly negative
expected payoff. That is, in the state of the world where ﬁrm i defaults, the payoff associated with
the futures contract is zero to both parties; in the state of the world where ﬁrm i does not default,
ﬁrm i must either make or receive a positive payoff from its futures position. The party who must
make the positive payment in the non-defaulting state can make itself better off by not entering
into the contract in the ﬁrst place. Note that this result is independent of the assumed structure of
the product market.
3.1 Stage 1: Equilibrium Behavior for Firm 2
Suppose that at date 1, ﬁrm 1 has a futures position n1, ﬁrm 2 has a futures position n2, and at
date 2 ﬁrm 1’s output level is xs













2 + (ωs − Fω)n2, s ∈ {h,l}.
11If πs
2 is negative for all values of xs
2 ≥ 0, then ﬁrm 2 defaults in state s and its payoff will be zero. If
πs
2 is non-negative for some values of xs
2 ≥ 0, then ﬁrm 2’s SPE quantity choice is the maximizing
value of xs








1 − ωs)/2 ifa − xs
1 − ωs > 0
0 if a − xs
1 − ωs ≤ 0
, s ∈ {h,l}. (3)
In any equilibrium ﬁrm 2 never defaults. To see this suppose, to the contrary, that there is an
equilibrium where ﬁrm 2 defaults. Result 1 implies that ﬁrm 2’s futures position must be zero, i.e.,
n2 = 0, meaning that ﬁrm 2’s only source of payoff comes from production. But ﬁrm 2’s best
response function, (3), implies that it will only produce a positive level of output if its payoff is
greater than zero. Hence, ﬁrm 2 does not default, a contradiction.
Since ﬁrm 2’s best response function, (3), does not depend upon its own futures contract posi-
tion, n2, in equilibrium, ﬁrm 2’s futures position does not directly affect its behavior in the output
market. In determining its own futures and output contract positions, ﬁrm 1 will use the best re-
sponse function (3) to predict the behavior of ﬁrm 2. Since, in equilibrium, ﬁrm 2’s best response
function does not depend upon its own futures contract position, ﬁrm 1’s choice of output and fu-
tures contracts will also be independent of ﬁrm 2’s futures position. Hence, in equilibrium, ﬁrm 2’s
futures contract position can not indirectly—i.e., via ﬁrm 1—affect its own production decision.
Finally, since in any equilibrium ﬁrm 2 does not default, any (equilibrium) futures contract position
it takes has a zero expected value. All these observations imply,
In equilibrium, ﬁrm 2’s futures market position can not affect its expected payoff: There does not
exist an economic rationale for ﬁrm 2 to hedge.
12At one level, this result may appear to be somewhat counterintuitive. In particular, if one inter-
prets a futures contract as being a vehicle for altering ex post unit costs of inputs, then, because best
response functions depend upon unit costs, one should expect that equilibrium quantities would be
affected by the purchase or sale of futures contracts. This intuition is, however, misguided because
a futures contract just provides the ﬁrm with a state contingent “cash” payoff and does not directly
affect the real resource costs of the inputs. Since ﬁrm 2 makes its production decision after input
costs are known, it will base its output decision on the actual resource costs that prevail at the time
the production decision is made. As a result, the buying or selling futures contracts prior to the
resolution of uncertainty does not confer any (ex post) strategic advantage the ﬁrm 2. Henceforth,
we shall assume through out that if futures contracts do not affect ﬁrm i’s behavior and payoff,
where i = 1,2, then ﬁrm i will take a zero position in the futures market, i.e., ni = 0.
Generally speaking, the above result implies that the existence of limited liability and non-
competitive behavior can not by themselves rationalize a ﬁrm’s use of futures contracts. This is
an interesting observation since the assumption of non-competitive behavior in the output market
is a departure from the Modigliani-Miller world of perfect markets: hence the relaxation of some
‘perfect markets’ assumption may, in equilibrium, still lead to ‘perfect markets’ outcomes.
3.2 Stage 2: Equilibrium Behavior for Firm 1
Firm 1 formulates its futures and forward positions knowing that ﬁrm 2 will behave according
to (3) in the output market. We will consider ﬁrm 1’s optimal choice of forward contracts, X1,
assuming ﬁrst that it never defaults and then assuming that it defaults in state h.
133.2.1 No default outcomes
Suppose that ﬁrm 1 delivers output xs
1 = X1 in s ∈ {1,2}, i.e., it does not default. Given the
behavior by ﬁrm 2, equation (3), the forward price for delivery of output contract, f, will be8
f =
a − X1 + ¯ ω
2
.
Hence, ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁt is,9
(
a − X1 + ¯ ω
2
− ¯ ω)X1. (4)
Given that ﬁrm 1 does not default, the optimal number of forward contracts that it offers, X1, will






a − ¯ ω
2
. (5)
8In state s total output supplied is (a−X1−ωs)/2+X1. The expected price of output (which is the forward price
f) is
a − (θ
a + X1 − ωl
2
+ (1 − θ)




a − X1 + ¯ ω
2
9We have assumed that a + ¯ ω > 2ωh. This implies that if ﬁrm 1 chooses the value of X1 that maximizes (4) and
does not default, then ﬁrm 2 will supply strictly positive levels of output in both states of the world. In this situation,
the expected spot price will be a−X
1+¯ ω
2 . One can interpret a+ ¯ ω > 2ωh as assuming that the unit cost in the high cost
state is not ‘too high’ in the sense that if ﬁrm 1 chooses that level of output contracts which maximizes its expected
payoff (assuming that it does not default), then there will still be a strictly positive residual demand for ﬁrm 2 in state
h.
14If ﬁrm 1 sells XN
1 forward contracts and does not default, then, given that ﬁrm 2 behaves optimally,
ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁt, E(Π1(XN




(a − ¯ ω)2
8
.
Note that the expressions for output and proﬁt both the ‘leader’ and ‘follower’ correspond to the
‘standard’ Stackelberg formulae for the leader’s and follower’s output and proﬁt.
3.2.2 Default outcomes
Suppose now that ﬁrm 1 defaults in state h. Hence, it must be the case that n1 = 0. At date 1 the
representative consumer understands that ﬁrm 1 will default in state h: accordingly, he will price
the forward contracts consistent with delivery only in state l. If X1 forward contracts are purchased
and ﬁrm 1 defaults on delivery in state h, then the forward price, f, will be
f = pl =
a − X1 + ωl
2
.
The ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁt is
θ(














1 . If ﬁrm 1 sells XD∗
1 forward contracts and defaults in state h, then its
expected proﬁt, E(Π1(XD∗
1 )), will be
E(Π1(X
D∗




It is important to note that if ﬁrm 1 sells XD∗
1 forward contracts it does not imply that it will default
in state h. For example, if f > ωh and n1 = 0, then the ﬁrm 1 will not default in either state of the
world. Deﬁne XDcrit
1 = a + ¯ ω − 2ωh as that critical level of forward contracts such that if ﬁrm 1
offers more than XDcrit
1 forward contracts and if n1 = 0, then it will default in state h.10 Assuming







1 )) = θωh(a + ¯ ω − 2ωh)
It will be convenient to deﬁne XD
1 = max{XD∗
1 ,XDcrit
1 } and the expected payoff to ﬁrm 1 associ-
ated with offering XD
1 output contracts as E(Π1(XD
1 )).
3.3 Equilibrium
The SPE outcomes for the Stackelberg market structure game are determined by simply comparing
the magnitudes of E(Π1(XN
1 )) and E(Π1(XD
1 )).
10This critical level of output contracts is determined by the equality of the output contract delivery price, f, with
the unit cost in the high state of the world, ωh, i.e.,
ωh =
a − X1 + ¯ ω
2
.
Earlier, we have assumed that a + ¯ ω > 2ωh. In the context of the above equation, the assumed inequality implies that
there exists a value of forward contract, X1, such that ﬁrm 1 defaults in state h and not in state l.
16Forward contracting without default If E(Π1(XN
1 )) ≥ E(Π1(XD
1 )), then there will exist an
SPE in which ﬁrm 1 offers XN
1 forward contracts. In addition, if (f − ωh) < 0, then an SPE
that has ﬁrm 1 offering XN
1 forward contracts can only be supported if ﬁrm 1 purchases futures
contracts. That is, in this situation if ﬁrm 1 does not hedge its input prices, then its proﬁt will be
strictly less than E(Π1(XN
1 )): hence, hedging is valuable to ﬁrm 1.11 If, however, (f − ωh) > 0,
then the unique SPE will be characterized by ﬁrm 1 offering XN
1 forward contracts. But hedging
is not required since the state contingent revenues will always exceed the state contingent total
costs.12
Forward contracting with default If E(Π1(XD
1 )) > E(Π1(XN
1 )), then the unique SPE will be
characterized by ﬁrm 1 offering XD
1 forward contracts. Since, in this equilibrium, ﬁrm 1 defaults
in the high cost state of the world, it does not purchase or sell any futures contracts.13
We have describe the various equilibria that can arise in the Stackelberg market structure game.
We have not, however, addressed the issue of existence of equilibrium. We defer this discussion to
Section 5, when we characterize the equilibrium to the overall game.
11It can be shown that if E(Π1(XN
1 )) ≥ E(Π1(XD
1 )) and XN
1 > XD
crit
1 , then X1 = XN
1 , N1 = n1 > 0, N2 = 0
and xs
2 = (a − XN
1 − ωs)/2 can be supported as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, where
(a − ¯ ω)(a + 3¯ ω − 4ωh)
8(ωh − ¯ ω)
< N1 <
(a − ¯ ω)(a + 3¯ ω − 4ωl)
8(¯ ω − ωh)
.
12It can be shown that X1 = XN
1 , N1 = N2 = 0, and xs
2 = (a − XN − ωs)/2 can be supported as a subgame
perfe1ct Nash equilibrium when E(Π1(XN
1 )) ≥ E(Π1(XD




13It can be shown that if E(Π1(XD
1 )) ≥ E(Π1(XN
1 )), then X1 = XD
1 , N1 = N2 = 0, xl
2 = (a − XN
1 − ωl)/2
and xh
2 = (a − ωh)/2 can be supported as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
174 Analysis of an ‘Ex post Cournot Market Structure’
In this section we assume that ﬁrm 1 does not offer any forward contracts, i.e., X1 = 0, and instead
competes with ﬁrm 2 in the date 2 spot market. Without loss of generality, we will assume that
neither ﬁrm buys or sells futures contracts.14 The game boils down to a very simple and familiar
structure: Both ﬁrms observe the state of the world and then, at date 2, simultaneously choose their
outputs.


























We now allow ﬁrm 1 to choose whether to compete by writing forward contracts with consumers
at date 1 or to compete in the date 2 spot market.
14Recall that in the Stackelberg market structure, there is no strategic value in purchasing futures contracts for the
ﬁrm that competes in the ex post spot market. This result also applies to the situation where both ﬁrms compete in the
ex post spot market.
18If, in equilibrium, ﬁrm 1 chooses to compete by writing forward contracts, i.e., ﬁrm 1 chooses
X1 > 0 at date 1, then the equilibrium outcomes are those described in Section 3; if, in equilibrium,
ﬁrm 1 chooses to compete in the ex post spot market, i.e., ﬁrm 1 chooses X1 = 0 at date 1, then
the equilibrium outcomes are those described in Section 4. The equilibrium that prevails can be
determined by simply comparing the various expected proﬁts that ﬁrm 1 can generate. Depending
upon model parameters, it is possible to have equilibria where: (1) both ﬁrms compete ex post; (2)
ﬁrm 1 competes in forward contracts and defaults in the high cost state; (3) ﬁrm 1 purchases futures
contracts, competes in forward contracts and does not default and; (4) ﬁrm 1 does not purchase
futures contracts, competes in forward contracts and does not default.
Spot Market competition If EΠC > max{E(Π1(XN
1 )),E(Π1(XD∗
1 ))}, then the unique SPE
to the game has ﬁrm 1 (and ﬁrm 2) competing in the date 2 spot market. There can not exist an
equilibrium where ﬁrm 1 offers forward contracts because ﬁrm 1 can increase its expected payoff
by simply offering no forward contracts at date 1, X1 = 0, and competing in the spot market. The
strategies along the equilibrium path are: X1 = 0, N1 = N2 = 0 and xs
i = (a − ωs)/3 for s = 1,2
and i = 1,2.
This equilibrium can exist for certain model parameters. Note that the condition EΠC >
E(Π1(XN
1 )), can be rewritten as
θ(1 − θ)(ωh − ωl)
2 >
(a − ¯ ω)2
8
(7)
19and, assuming that XD∗
1 > Xcrit
1 , condition EΠC > E(Π1(XD
1 )) can be rewritten as





Both of the above inequalities—as well as XD∗
1 > Xcrit
1 —are satisﬁed, and hence the equilibrium
exists, for the following parameters: θ = .5, ωh = 1.5, ωl = 0 and a = 2.
Intuitively, when would such an equilibrium prevail? Condition (7) can hold if ωh − ωl and
θ(1 − θ) are, relatively speaking, ‘large’. Note that the value of θ(1 − θ) is maximized at θ = .5.
Hence, if there is a lot of uncertainty in terms of which state will prevail and the state contingent
unit input costs are substantially different from one another, then ﬁrm 1 may prefer to compete ex
post. It is true that in this equilibrium ﬁrm 1 gives up its ‘ﬁrst-mover’ advantage but by giving
up this ﬁrst-mover advantage, ﬁrm 1 is able to make better (more proﬁtable) ex post production
decisions by waiting to observe the state of the world. If ﬁrm 1 knew for sure what state would
prevail at date 2, it would sell (a − ωs)/2 forward contracts in state s. However, since it does not
knowwhatstatewillprevail, ifitdoeschoosetosellforwardcontracts, itwillsell(a−¯ ω)/2, i.e., the
‘average’ of the optimal state contingent levels. But if θ = .5 and the difference between ωh and ωl
is ‘large’, then the difference between the ‘optimal’ amount of forward contracts to sell, (a−ωs)/2
in state s, and the actual amount sold, (a − ¯ ω)/2, will also be large. It, therefore, may be more
proﬁtable to forsake the ﬁrst-mover advantage to be able to produce output on a state contingent
basis. Condition (8) can hold if (a − ωh) is, relatively speaking, ‘large’. A ‘large’ (a − ωh) means
that it is proﬁtable to produce in the high cost state. If it was not too proﬁtable to produce in the
high cost state, then ﬁrm 1 would prefer to essentially ignore the high cost state—that is, it would
default in this state—and offer (a − ωl)/2 forward contracts at date 1.
20Forwardcontractingwithdefault IfE(Π1(XD
1 )) > max{EΠC,E(Π1(XN
1 ))}, thentheunique
equilibrium outcome has ﬁrm 1 competing contractually and defaulting in the high cost state. In
this equilibrium neither ﬁrm uses the futures contracts. The strategies along the equilibrium path
are: X1 = XD
1 , N1 = N2 = 0 and xs
2 = (a − xs
1 − ωs)/2 for s = 1,2 and i = 1,2.




1 )) > E(Π1(XN
1 )), can be rewritten as
θ(a − ωl)
2 > (a − ¯ ω)
2 (9)
and condition E(Π1(XD




> (1 − θ)(a − ωh)
2 (10)
Both of these inequalities—as well as XD∗
1 > Xcrit
1 —will be satisﬁed, and hence the equilibrium
exists, for, θ = .8, ωh = .6, ωl = 0 and a = 1.
A forward contracting equilibrium with default can occur if θ is relatively large, see conditions
(9) and (10). A large θ means that the high cost state’s contribution to expected proﬁt will be
small. As well, for such an equilibrium to exist, it will also be required that (a − ωh) is, relatively
speaking, small, see condition (10). A small (a − ωh) implies that actual proﬁt in the high cost
state will be low. If both of these conditions hold, then it will be optimal to essentially ignore
(i.e., default in) the high cost state. Hence, ﬁrm 1 will sell that amount of forward contracts which
maximizes proﬁt in the low cost state, (a − ωl)/2.
21Forward contracting without default: If E(Π1(XN
1 ) > max{EΠC,E(Π1(XD
1 ))}, then the
unique equilibrium has ﬁrm 1 offering XN
1 forward contracts at date 1. If, in addition XN
1 > Xcrit
1 ,
then this equilibrium can only be supported if ﬁrm 1 hedges its input prices. Assuming that XD∗
1 >
Xcrit
1 , condition E(Π1(XN
1 )) > E(Π1(XD
1 )), can be rewritten as
(a − ¯ ω)
2 > θ(a − ωl)
2 (11)
and condition E(Π1(XN
1 )) > EΠC can be rewritten as
(a − ¯ ω)2
8
> (1 − θ)(ωh − ωl). (12)
Both of these inequalities—as well as XD∗
1 > Xcrit
1 —are satisﬁed for θ = .7, ωh = 1, ωl = 0 and
a = 3. Note also that for these parameters values XN
1 > Xcrit
1 , which implies that ﬁrm 1 must
hedge in this equilibrium in order to achieve the payoff of E(Π1(XN
1 )).15
A forward contracting equilibrium without default can occur if the probability of the good state
occurring is ‘not too large’, see condition (11). Otherwise it would be optimal to sell more forward
contracts and default in the high cost state. As well, the difference between state contingent input
costs can not be too great, see condition (12). The importance of this condition is that while
forward contracting implies that ﬁrm 1 produces ‘too little’ in the low cost state and ‘too much’
in the high cost state, the difference between what the leader would ideally like to sell and what it
actually sells is not that great. Here, the ﬁrst-mover advantage outweighs the beneﬁt of being able
to produce on a state contingent basis.
15The above inequalities are also satisﬁed for the parameters θ = .7, ωh = 1, ωl = .5 and a = 3.5. However, for
these parameters XN
1 < Xcrit
1 , meaning that ﬁrm 1 does not have to hedge in this equilibrium.
22Discussion
General Characterization of Equilibria Generally speaking, there are four possible equilibria
that may arise: (a) ﬁrm 1 sells non-defaulting forward contracts but must purchase futures contracts
to ensure that it does not default on its forward contracts; (b) ﬁrm 1 sells non-defaulting forward
contracts and does not need to purchase futures contracts; (c) ﬁrm 1 sells forward contracts and
defaults in the high cost state; and (d) ﬁrm 1 does not sell any forward contracts but, instead,
competes in the ex post spot market. In case (a) ﬁrm 1 has a strict incentive to purchase futures
contracts because it can achieve a level of expected proﬁts that is unattainable in the absence of
purchasing futures contracts. In cases (b)-(d), ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 have no strict incentive to purchase
futures contracts because, in these cases, purchasing futures contracts does not add any value to
the ﬁrm. (In fact, for case (c) if ﬁrm 1 purchases sufﬁcient number of futures contracts so it does
not default, the value of the ﬁrm will actually fall.) Hence our model predicts that some ﬁrms will
hedge their cash ﬂows and others will not. This result is consistent with the observation (Smithson
[1996])thatwhilealargefraction(65%)oflargeUSnon-ﬁnancialﬁrmsusedderivativestomanage
risk, there also exists a large number of ﬁrms that do not.
Relax Restrictions on Firm 2 We have structured the model so that ﬁrm 1 has a choice between
selling its output contractually or selling it in the ex post spot market. But we have restricted ﬁrm
2 to sell its output only in the ex post spot market. To what extent do our results and insights
depend upon this restriction? It turns out that if ﬁrm 2 is given the same choice as ﬁrm 1, then the
only equilibrium allocations that exist are (qualitatively speaking) those that are described above.
Speciﬁcally, the only equilibria that can exist are characterized by one of the following:
231. one ﬁrm sells non-defaulting forward contracts and must purchase futures contracts to ensure
that it does not default while the other ﬁrm produces for the spot market,
2. one ﬁrm sells non-defaulting forward contracts that does not need to purchase futures con-
tracts while the other ﬁrm produces for the spot market,
3. one ﬁrm sells forward contracts that it defaults on in the high cost state while the other ﬁrm
produces for the spot market, or
4. both ﬁrms produce for the spot market.
Perhaps, surprisingly, there does not exist an equilibrium where both ﬁrms compete in forward
contracts. To understand this, suppose that there is an equilibrium where both ﬁrms sell forward
contracts at date 1 and, in this equilibrium, neither ﬁrm defaults on it forward contract obligation16:
ﬁrm 1 sells X1 forward contracts and ﬁrm 2 sell X2 forward contracts. Suppose that ﬁrm 2 defects
from proposed play by selling zero forward contracts at date 1: this defection implies that ﬁrm
2 will produce for the spot market. Firm 2 will maximize its ex post payoff by producing xs
2 =
(a−X1−ωs)/2unitsofoutputin states. Note thatitwillneverbethecase thatxh
2 = xl
2. Given that
ﬁrm 1 produces X1, if xs
2 6= X2 for both states of the world, then ﬁrm 2 will be able to increase its
proﬁt in both states of the world by defecting from equilibrium play; if xs
2 = X2 for one state of the
world, say h, then xl
2 6= X1 and, hence, by defecting from equilibrium play, ﬁrm 2 can increase its
proﬁt in state l while maintaining the same level of proﬁt in state h. Therefore, ﬁrm 2 will always
defect from proposed equilibrium play. The intuition behind this result is straightforward: by
defecting from proposed play ﬁrm 2 has the ﬂexibility of supplying the ex post proﬁt maximizing
16The no-default assumption is made simply for illustrative purposes. If either one or both ﬁrms do default, then the
logic of the argument that follows still applies.
24level of output, given that ﬁrm 1 always produces X1. Since the ex post proﬁt maximizing level
of output for ﬁrm 2, given that ﬁrm 1 produces X1, is not constant, defecting from proposed
equilibrium play will unambiguously increase ﬁrm 2 expected payoff. Hence, one should interpret
the model restriction that ﬁrm 2 can only produce for the spot market as a simplifying assumption.
Margin Accounts In practice, participants in futures markets must post or deposit margin ac-
counts with the futures exchange. Intuitively, the size of an individual’s margin account equals the
loss that the individual’s futures position can sustain if prices move against it. Hence, a margin
account protects the futures exchange from default.17 We have assumed that ﬁrms do not have any
outside wealth and, as a result, can not post a margin. Consider the equilibrium where it is optimal
for ﬁrm 1 to sell X1
N forward contracts but to do so it must purchase futures contracts (because
XN
1 > XDcrit
1 ). Suppose now that ﬁrm 1 has precisely that amount of outside wealth to cover the
loss that its futures position would incur if input prices turned out to be high. It might appear that
the purchase of futures contracts is redundant since the ﬁrm is now able to commit to producing
XN
1 in the high cost state by ‘pledging’ its outside wealth. Let’s slightly generalize our model and
suppose that the economy is repeated twice, where the states of the world—which will be revealed
between dates 1 and 2 and dates 3 and 4—are independently distributed. In this environment,
futures contracts will continue to have value to ﬁrm 1. To see this, suppose that ﬁrm 1 does not
purchase futures contracts at date 1—it commits to producing XN
1 in the high cost state through
its outside wealth—and the state of the world (at date 2) turns out to be the high cost state. At date
3, ﬁrm 1 will have no outside wealth since it was needed to produce output at date 2. Now, ﬁrm
17If an individual attempts to ‘default’ on its position, the futures exchange will immediately reverse the position,
i.e., liquidates the position, and any losses that the exchange encurs is taken out of the margin account.
251 will be unable to commit to producing XN
1 at date 4: it has no outside wealth and can not post
the required margin to purchase futures contracts. Suppose instead that ﬁrm 1 purchases futures
contracts at date 1, (its outside wealth is placed in a margin account). If, at date 2, the state of the
world turns out to be the high cost state, ﬁrm 1’s margin account will be credited and ﬁrm 1 will
be able to produce XN
1 from the payoff of its futures contract. Most importantly, ﬁrm 1’s outside
wealth will remain in tact. Hence, ﬁrm 1 will be able to commit to producing XN
1 at date 4. If,
at date 2, the state of the world turns out to be the low cost state, ﬁrm 1’s outside wealth, which
was deposited in a margin account, will be used to pay off its futures contract losses. However, the
proﬁt that ﬁrm 1 makes from its production will strictly exceed its (initial) outside wealth. Hence,
ﬁrm 1 will have sufﬁcient resources at date 3 to guarantee a production level of XN
1 at date 4.
In summary, a ﬁrm that has sufﬁcient internal resources to guarantee production in either state of
the world may have a strict incentive to purchase futures contracts when margin accounts must be
posted.
6 Conclusions
Suppose that a limitedly liable ﬁrm with market power sells its output before all factors that can
affect its proﬁtability are known. By hedging its cash ﬂows, the ﬁrm may be able to increase
the set of allocations from which it can choose. In a way, hedging allows the ﬁrm to commit to
delivering levels of output it otherwise could not do. In some circumstances, this commitment
turns out to be valuable. In particular, if one of the ‘commitment’ allocations can generate a higher
expected payoff than all of the unhedged allocations, then the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it strictly optimal to
hedge. In other circumstances, this commitment has no value. In fact, it may turn out that all of the
26‘commitment’ allocations result in strictly lower payoffs compared to some unhedged allocations.
In these situations, the ﬁrm strictly prefers not to hedge. Hence, we have provided a theory that
is consistent with the stylized fact that while some ﬁrms may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to hedge their cash
ﬂows, others do not.
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